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from numerous U.S. and international
figures who have played prominent
roles in Afghanistan since before and
after 9/11. In fact, Jones’s many citations and his approach of listing diverse
players with one-line, anecdotal physical descriptions or personality traits can
be overwhelming and even detract from
the narrative.
Nonetheless, this book does a superb
job of filling in the details of Afghanistan’s complex politics for scholars who
are interested in gaining a better understanding of the history, the state and
nonstate actors involved, and the many
civil and military leaders who have attempted to calm the political upheaval
in Afghanistan. Jones ably explains
how, after the United States and its allies quickly knocked the Taliban from
power, routed al-Qa‘ida, and set up a
popularly elected central government,
the country nonetheless failed to establish an adequate justice system and security for its populace—instead
allowing a robust insurgency to develop. With the experience of someone
who has walked the ground and talked
to the leaders on all sides, Jones effectively argues that the drug trade, highlevel government corruption, and the
lack of resources could, if not resolved,
lead to one more headstone in Afghanistan’s graveyard.
DOUGLAS J. WADSWORTH

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Naval War College
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Lee Zatarain, an attorney, has crafted a
compelling and immensely readable account of one of the least-known chapters
of the U.S. Navy’s maritime combat operations, the tanker war of 1987–88. The
tanker war was fought by three now very
familiar foes—Iran and Iraq (who had
been at war with each other since 1980),
and the United States, which became
embroiled in the conflict when an Iraqi
aircraft attacked and nearly sank one of
its frontline warships in 1987. Using new
information gained from the U.S. Navy
and other U.S. government sources, as
well as extensive interviews with the officers and crew who served in the Persian
Gulf during the fifteen-month war,
Zatarain examines and explains with
lawyerly precision the events that constituted the U.S. Navy’s combat operations
against Iranian naval forces.
Tanker War begins with a detailed account of the Iraqi attack on the guidedmissile frigate USS Stark in May 1987;
the first successful antiship-missile attack on a U.S. Navy warship, it resulted
in thirty-seven deaths. That attack,
however, precipitated no military response against Iraq by the United
States, largely because it was considered
to have been an unfortunate accident,
and Iraq was more of a friend than Iran.
Iran’s subsequent actions—laying
mines in the heavily trafficked channels
of the Gulf to interrupt the flow of Iraqi
oil and attacking civilian oil tankers—
forced the United States to side with
Iraq. As Zatarain explains in straightforward fashion, the conflict that ensued nearly cost the U.S. Navy another
warship, USS Samuel B. Roberts, and
subjected the Navy to several antishipmissile attacks by the Iranian military.
In retaliation, the U.S. Navy destroyed a
good part of the Iranian navy and
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effectively established the American
maritime dominance in the Persian
Gulf that exists to this day.
Among the key issues that Zatarain
raises in his gripping account of the
various battles fought between the
United States and Iran is the controversial claim by many U.S. Navy commanding officers that Iran used
Chinese-made Silkworm antiship missiles against American ships. Their
claims were discounted by senior military commanders, who refused to acknowledge that any such attacks had
occurred, despite extensive evidence to
the contrary—such attacks would have
required a military response that the
United States and the U.S. military were
neither willing nor able to undertake.
As political tensions have continued to
rise in recent years between the United
States and Iran, Tanker War is a mustread for those who have a desire or a
duty to understand how recent history
may shape perceptions of these protagonists in the future.
RON RATCLIFF

Naval War College

Graham, Bradley. By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald
Rumsfeld. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009. 803pp.
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In a speech given to Pentagon employees
on 10 September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the
“adversary that poses a threat, a serious
threat, to the security of the United
States” is not “decrepit dictators” but
rather “the Pentagon bureaucracy.” The
blunt message of this speech was very

soon to be bound together in a tensionfilled relationship with the ensuing wars
initiated by the terrorist attacks of the
next day. This tension gives dramatic
shape to the career of Donald Rumsfeld
as portrayed by Bradley Graham in his
well researched book By His Own Rules.
A veteran Washington Post correspondent, Graham intends that the title be regarded literally, as his detailed story
focuses on Rumsfeld as a master bureaucratic infighter who did indeed work by
his own rules. (The rules encapsulated
Rumsfeld’s views on serving and surviving in government and were eventually
printed in the Wall Street Journal.)
Rumsfeld applied the rules in his intense commitment to the type of U.S.
military President George W. Bush had
called for during his campaign, an “agile, lethal, readily deployable” armed
force. To build this force required a significant transformation of the outsized
and ponderous military developed during and immediately after the Cold
War. Graham portrays Rumsfeld as a
reformer who “had never met an organization he didn’t want to change” and
who had come well prepared to transform the Defense Department, but for
two untimely wars.
Rumsfeld’s personal goal of transforming the military seemed to overshadow
his responsibilities for prosecuting the
wars. Graham describes at length how
Rumsfeld’s missteps in managing the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused
him to become the “personification of
the arrogance and misjudgments of the
Bush Administration,” from damaging
interagency power struggles to intolerance of differing viewpoints, to a lack of
ability to acknowledge mistakes or
change strategies.
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